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Purpose: This study was conducted to examine the 
impact of corporate governance and CEO’s reputation 
toward value relevance. This study also examines how 
CEO’s reputation moderates the impact of corporate 
governance toward value relevance. The object of this 
research are banks that listed in Bursa Efek Indonesia 
(BEI) from 2016 and 2019. 
Design/methodology/approach: The purposive 
sampling method is used to select the research sample. 
The study use SmartPLS program to analyze data. The 
measurement of value relevance are share price, earning 
per share and net asset value per share. This study used 
board size, board independence, board activity, board 
gender diversity and staggered board to measure 
corporate governance. CEO’s reputation index is used to 
measure CEO’s reputation 
Findings: The results of this study show that by 
maximizing the board size can improve the value 
relevance of banks at Indonesia 
Practical implications:  These findings will be very 
helpful to management to increase the company's value 
relevance by managing board of directors. 
Originality/value:  This article provides a new insight of 
value relevance research as to how CEO’s reputation 
moderates the impact of corporate governance to value 
relevance.   
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Corporate governance, a term that in the last decade or two did not mean much except to a 
handful of academics and shareholders, has become a major topic of discussion in corporate 
boardrooms, academic meetings, and various events responsible for the increased attention 
and interest in corporate governance (Claessens, 2006). During the 1998 financial crisis in 
Russia, Asia and Brazil, the behavior of the corporate sector had an impact on the economy. 
Deficiencies in corporate governance threatened global financial stability, after which 
confidence in corporations was weakened due to corporate governance scandals in Europe 
and the United States that triggered the largest bankruptcy in history. These events not only 
raise the profile of the term corporate governance, but also make researchers, firms, and 
policymakers realize the long-term consequences of weak corporate governance systems 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
After the monetary crisis that occurred in Indonesia in 1998 and 1997, the Indonesian 
government made efforts to improve corporate governance and the quality of financial 
reporting in Indonesia. One of the government's efforts to achieve this was the issuance of 
regulations on reporting and disclosure by BAPEPAM in 2002 (Siagian et al., 2013). One of 
the most important functions of corporate governance is to ensure the quality of accounting 
information by enforcing compliance with appropriate standards (de Almeida et al., 2009). 
Previous research has found that the market price of companies that comply with corporate 
governance is higher than those that do not (Alfraih et al., 2015). 
Corporate governance is defined as something that affects corporate processes, including 
those that appoint controllers and regulators, including the production and sale of goods and 
services (Turnbull, 1997). The quality of the corporate governance framework affects not 
only the external financing of the firm, but also the cost of capital and the value of the firm; 
outsiders tend to be reluctant to provide financing and demand high returns when they feel 
uncertain about the return (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). The positive externalities of 
corporate governance cause policymakers to explore the idea of enforcing corporate 
governance on a mandatory or voluntary basis because some corporate governance 
disclosures can increase firm value (Ararat & Yurtoglu, 2016).  
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In addition, accounting figures are defined as relevant if they have a predictable relationship 
with the market value of equity (Barth et al., 2001). Relevant is one of the four qualitative 
characteristics that financial statements must have. To be relevant, accounting information 
must be able to make a difference in a decision (Kieso et al., 2014). The importance of 
financial reports as a means of communicating the state of the company with shareholders 
and the public, relevant issues are one of the important objects worth exploring, the relevant 
value of accounting information has become the ability of financial data to summarize the 
enterprise value or become reflective information that affects the stock market (Fiador, 
2013). The quality of a financial report can be measured by the company's stock price 
(Omokhudu & Ibadin, 2015). In the literature review, many examine the direct effect of 
corporate governance on the relevant value of the company (Almari, 2017; Almujamed & 
Alfraih, 2020; Fiador, 2013), previous researchers found mixed and weak results, the 
relationship between corporate governance and value. Relevant companies can be influenced 
by several factors that have been forgotten by previous research. 
On the other hand, CEOs tend to be the strongest members of the corporate elite because of 
their legitimate hierarchical status and commitment to the organization (Brown & Sarma, 
2007). CEOs tend to be primarily committed to the status quo, establishing the correctness of 
current strategies and persistence in certain leadership actions. In the organizational realm, 
the CEO's commitment to the organization is viewed as a moral imperative that 
demonstrates the strength of his or her identification and commitment to an organization 
(Yucel et al., 2014). Kitchen (2003); Murray & White (2005) consider the CEO to be the main 
person responsible for reputation management. CEOs are the human force behind the 
company's actions and results (Love et al., 2017). Recent studies have shown that positive 
CEO reputation can influence stakeholders' perceptions about the organization (Weng & 
Chen, 2017). 
This study is motivated by the theory put forward by (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1979) namely the 
resource dependence theory, which states that companies depend on the external 
environment for their survival and the CEO's personal reputation is an indication of the 
environment outside the company. The existing literature review focuses on the research on 
the relationship between corporate governance and CEO reputation (Ljubojevic, C.; 
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Ljubojeví, 2008), on the other hand, many research also investigate the relationship between 
CEO reputation and relevant value of the firm (Nelson, 2005; Weng & Chen, 2017), can the 
relationship between corporate governance and relevant value of the firm be enhanced by 
CEO reputation? This question has not yet been discussed in the literature. Therefore, this 
study aims to contribute to the empirical literature on value relevance by examining the 
extent to which accounting information is related to corporate governance and the influence 
of CEO reputation on the relationship between corporate governance and relevance value of 
accounting information in Indonesia. 
2.  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Value Relevance 
Relevance is one of the two fundamental qualities that make accounting information useful 
for decision making. Relevance has three components, namely predictive value, confirmatory 
value and materiality. To be relevant, accounting information must be able to make a 
difference in decisions (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (IAI), 2018). Relevant value can also be 
defined as the ability of accounting information to explain the value of the company (Kargin, 
2013). Accounting information can be said to be relevant if it has a relationship with stock 
market prices (Barth et al., 2001). The main objective of relevance research is to investigate 
whether the financial statements prepared by the company are of good quality and whether 
they provide valuable accounting information for decision making by their users (Alfaraih & 
Alanezi, 2011). 
If the numbers in accounting have a predictable relationship with the market value of the 
equity, they are known as relevant values (Barth et al., 2001). The stock value of a business 
may indicate the quality of a financial report (Omokhudu & Ibadin, 2015). As a result, share 
price, earnings per share, and net asset value per share are used to calculate the value 
relevance in this analysis. Share price is taken from the share price in company i in year t 
when the earnings per share are net profit after tax but before the abnormal item is divided 
by the number of shares in company i in year t and the total assets minus the total liabilities 
of company i in year t divided by the number of shares outstanding yields the book value net 
per share. 
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2.2 Board Size  
Academics, regulators, and market investors have all paid close attention to the topic of 
board size as a corporate governance tool in recent years (Johl et al., 2015). The number of 
members of the company's board of directors with a nominal scale as an indicator of the 
board's size is referred to as the board's size. According to Tshipa et al., (2018), the method 
for determining the size of the board of directors is as follows. 
Board Size = The total number of directors on the board of directors 
2.3 Board Independence 
According to the agency's theory, having an independent board of directors on a company's 
board will help to control management on behalf of shareholders by bringing independent 
votes into the board room, which will eliminate a known conflict of interest between 
shareholders and the company's management (Kakabadse et al., 2010). Shareholders trust 
independent directors to represent them and help reduce agency issues (Fuzi et al., 2016). 
The independence of the board of directors is measured on a nominal scale. According to 
Tshipa et al., (2018), the board of directors' independence formula is as follows. 
Board Independence = Directors Independent/Total Directors on the Board 
2.4 Board Activity 
The number of board meetings during the year is used to describe the board's activity. The 
frequency of board meetings is one way to gauge board operation. The frequency of meeting 
bias is one criterion for determining whether a board of directors is active or inactive 
(Harvey Pamburai et al., 2015). The board of directors' operation is calculated on a nominal 
scale. The following is the formula for the board of directors' activity, according to Tshipa et 
al., (2018). 
Board Activity = The number of board meetings during a year 
2.5 Board Gender Diversity 
The larger the number of women on the board of directors, the higher the company's 
economic value Reguera-Alvarado et al., (2017). The council's gender diversity is calculated 
on a nominal scale. According to Tshipa et al., (2018) the formula for gender diversity on the 
board of directors is as follows. 
Board Gender Diversity = Women Directors/Total Directors on the Board 
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2.6 Staggered Board 
One of the most controversial issues in academic and business circles is the influence of 
shifting board positions on corporate value. Around 60% of US companies have introduced 
strong anti-acquisition provisions (ATPs), which enable them to influence the board of 
directors annual elections (Duru et al., 2013). The staggered board in this study is a dummy 
variable that receives number one if the board of directors rotates every three years, zero if 
it is not given. 
2.7 CEO’s Reputation 
The CEO's reputation is one of the external environmental factors, and Pfeffer (1972) 
indicates that the company's survival is dependent on the external environment in his theory 
of resource dependence. As a result, CEO's reputation will help reinforce the connection 
between corporate governance and the company's relevant value. Since the evaluation of 
these ideas requires personal characteristics, determining a metric for the CEO's credibility is 
difficult. Several studies have attempted to identify these proxies, including: 
• Press exposure: CEOs are seen as influential leaders by the media, as shown by the 
extensive press coverage (Park & Berger, 2004). 
• CEO Award: Winners of the CEO Award go on to become superstar CEOs with a 
strong reputation in the business world (Shi et al., 2017). 
• CEO's mandate: this is the length of time or amount of years that the CEO has been in 
his current position; a longer period for the CEO indicates that the company's board 
of directors has traditionally tended to keep this executive role (Bernstein et al., 
2016). 
• Outsiders vs. insiders: Outsider CEOs are more likely to adopt new company 
techniques and policies than insider CEOs (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). 
• Age of the CEO: it is a proxy for the market uncertainty about the CEO's credibility 
(Serfling, 2014). 
People assess others based on subjective factors such as skills and education, as well as 
objective physical characteristics such as sex and age. These characteristics can affect the 
CEO's public profile (Fetscherin, 2015). Participation in a professional body demonstrates 
the CEO's integrity, which requires his or her experience (Men, 2012), which is one of the 
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criteria used to evaluate the CEO's reputation. The length of the CEO's mandate affects 
market expectations of his or her abilities; the longer the CEO's mandate, the more chances 
for the board to evaluate the CEO's abilities. Since the CEO survived the previous retention or 
dismissal, a longer period for him means a higher ranking of his expertise on the board (Jian 
& Lee, 2011). The CEO's previous experience with organizational restructuring, as well as his 
previous role in the business, have helped to establish his credibility (Ranft et al., 2006). 
According to Niap & Taylor (2012), the CEO's reputation index, which is shown in the table 
below, is used to measure the CEO's reputation. 
Table 1: CEO’s reputation index 
Index Description 
CEO qualification 
1 Diploma or lower 
2 Bachelor’s degree 
3 Post graduate qualification 
Participation in a professional body 
1 None 
2 Membership of one professional body 
3 Membership of more than one professional bodies  
CEO tenure 
1 Not more than one year 
2 Not more than three years 
3 More than three years 
CEO experience 
1 had previous management experience, but not as a 
company's president director or CEO 
2 had previous management experience, as a company's 
president director or CEO of a non-listed company 
3 had previous management experience, as a company's 
president director or CEO of a listed company 
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2.8 Board Size and Value Relevance 
Due to the lack of definitive evidence on the effect of board size on firm valuation, 
researchers, regulators, and market participants have centered their attention on the topic of 
board size as a corporate governance tool (Johl et al., 2015). A large size of the board of 
directors helps to guide and advise the strategic decisions of the company and plays an 
important role in creating a corporate identity that increases the relevant value of the 
company (Tulung & Ramdani, 2018). A large board of directors also is more likely to have 
more knowledge, skills and experience than a smaller one (Krismiaji & Surifah, 2020). 
Almujamed & Alfraih (2020); Krismiaji & Surifah, (2020); Krismiaji & Kusumadewi (2019); 
Tshipa et al., (2018); Tulung & Ramdani (2018) stated according to the agency theory, which 
claims that a larger board of directors improves firm value relevance by allowing for greater 
oversight by a wider group of individuals, as well as the resource dependence theory, which 
claims that a larger board of directors offers a wide range of benefits and greater tracking 
capability thanks to experience and information in a variety of fields. It also strengthens the 
firm's ability to build external ties (Kalsie & Shrivastav, 2016). From the statement above, the 
hypothesis was concluded as below: 
H1 = Board size has significant positive effect on value relevance. 
2.9 Board Independence and Value Relevance 
There are several theoretical and analytical controversies in the corporate governance 
literature regarding the efficacy of the non-executive board system (Ramdani & 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). The agency's hypothesis, on the other hand, contends that having a 
higher proportion of independent directors would improve company efficiency. This theory 
suggests that managers are egotistical, opportunistic, and greedy and that effective board 
oversight is the secret to ensuring that effective executives are more concerned with the 
interests of shareholders than with their own (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Independent 
director on board will enhance oversight and have a more objective perspective that caused 
objective decision making which will boost the value relevance of the company (Ayodeji & 
Okunade, 2019; Krismiaji & Kusumadewi, 2019; Tshipa et al., 2018; Tulung & Ramdani, 
2018; Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018). From the statement above, the hypothesis was 
concluded as below: 
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H2 = Board independence has significant positive effect on value relevance. 
2.10 Board Activity and Value Relevance 
The number of board meetings in a year is known as board activity (Harvey Pamburai et al., 
2015). Since there are costs associated with board meetings, such as management time, 
travel expenses, and director meeting costs, the relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and the related statistics is not clear. However, there is also the benefit of more 
time for discussion, plan definition, and management monitoring (Vafeas, 1999). More 
meetings suggest a greater capacity for directors to track their participation, and wider 
discussions lead to better decisions, thus increasing the company's relevance value (Al-
Daoud et al., 2016). The frequency of board meetings may be used to evaluate the efficiency 
of the board (Eluyela et al., 2018). Al-Daoud et al., (2016); Eluyela et al., (2018); Mandala 
(2019); Shittu et al., (2016); Techan Demeke (2016) finds the agency's hypothesis, which 
states that as boards meet more often, their ability to track, counsel, study, and build a 
disciplined environment improves, allowing them to achieve their financial targets and 
optimize shareholder capital (Eluyela et al., 2018). From the statement above, the hypothesis 
was concluded as below: 
H3 = Board activity has significant positive effect on value relevance. 
2.11 Board Gender Diversity and Value Relevance 
Evidence of a direct relationship between the company's relevant values and the board's 
gender diversity is still elusive. Several recent studies have looked into this empirical 
problem, but no clear findings have been found (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014). Gender should 
not be an issue for the roles of the directors because the directors may have a positive impact 
on the company's success if analyzed from the agency's theory (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). 
Gender diversity on the board of directors has been shown to have a substantial positive 
impact on the company's relevant value in many previous studies (Agyemang-Mintah & 
Hannu, 2017; Green & Homroy, 2018; Owen & Temesvary, 2018; Taljaard et al., 2015; Valls 
Martínez & Cruz Rambaud, 2019). In Taljaard et al., (2015) opinion, increasing diversity 
encourages self-sufficiency and decreases organization issues. The board's external network 
is also extended as a result of the increased diversity, allowing various stakeholders' needs to 
be met while reducing dependency on strategic capital. The combination of different skills 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 7/3 (2021): 60-85 
 
 69 
and experiences is correlated with improved value relevance as human resources increase. 
Different viewpoints are also introduced from heterogeneous communities as a consequence 
of different abilities and backgrounds that lead to the increases of firm market value (Valls 
Martínez & Cruz Rambaud, 2019). Thus, these study validates the resource dependence 
hypothesis, which argues that gender diversity enhances decision-making and helps 
companies better integrate with external environments and resources, resulting in improved 
financial efficiency. These advantages incur because women can bring a range of attributes, 
backgrounds, and goals to the board, resulting in a stronger evaluation of the business's 
complexities, which enhances the company's profitability and corporate governance 
efficiency. From the statement above, the hypothesis was concluded as below: 
H4 = Board gender diversity has significant positive effect on value relevance. 
2.12 Staggered Board and Value Relevance 
The change in the board of directors is seen by shareholders as a classic weakness in 
corporate governance. In his view, isolating non-executive directors from the market 
discipline reduces the liability of directors (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005). Changes in board 
positions, on the other hand, are seen as a tool for preserving board cohesion by proponents 
(Duru et al., 2013). Changing board positions in these businesses stimulates beneficial 
investment and creativity while reducing earnings control (Daines et al., 2017). The value of 
a company is positively associated with the existence of an alternate board of directors. 
Furthermore, it is related to the opacity of companies, the result become contradict when the 
opacity decrease (Duru et al., 2013). From the statement above, the hypothesis was 
concluded as below: 
H5 = Staggered board has significant positive effect on value relevance. 
2.13 Board Size and Value Relevance with CEO’s Reputation as Moderator 
Larger boards have more expertise, skills, and experience than smaller boards, resulting in 
more tools available for sharing, making peer views more viable (Vandewaerde et al., 2011). 
Similarly, Van Den Berghe & Levrau (2004) argue that increasing the number of directors 
helps the board to attract a diverse range of viewpoints on company policy and reduces the 
CEO's influence. However, the increased costs of inefficient communication and decision-
making associated with larger boards can outweigh the benefits (John & Senbet, 1998). The 
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external environment, on the other hand, is one of the aspects of the resource dependence 
theory suggested by Pfeffer (1972), which explains that the external environment, such as 
the CEO's network and director interlock, has a positive impact on the company's value. You 
do not have to look any further than the daily paper or the evening news to see how the 
CEO's credibility affects shareholder value. The CEO's credibility plays an important role in 
deciding how stakeholders judge the business, whether by stock sales, crisis response, or the 
development of the best talent pool in the industry (Gaines-Ross, 2000). The use of the CEO's 
reputation as a moderating variable between corporate governance and the company's 
relevance value can help to improve the relationship between the two. From the statement 
above, the hypothesis was concluded as below: 
H6 = The reputation of the CEO can moderate the relationship between the board size and the 
value relevance of the financial statements. 
2.14 Board Independence and Value Relevance with CEO’s Reputation as Moderator 
To reduce agency costs, especially for companies listed on national or international stock 
exchanges, an independent board of directors is required. Companies must follow good 
corporate governance standards, such as having a board of directors comprised of competent 
and knowledgeable independent directors, being accountable to shareholders, and having 
financial statements that are transparent (Kakabadse et al., 2010). According to the resource 
dependency theory, external environmental factors may affect a company's long-term 
viability (Pfeffer, 1972). A reduction in transaction costs associated with the company's 
external partnerships may be one of the benefits of connecting businesses to external 
environmental factors. Having an independent director with experience or legal expertise, 
for example, will lower the transaction costs of a regulatory agency. These directors' 
knowledge of the government contracting process, relevant contact persons, and the impact 
of proposed legislation will actually lower transaction costs between regulators and firms, 
giving the company a cost advantage over its rivals (Hillman et al., 2000). 
Musteen et al., (2010), on the other hand, based their research on the relationship between 
the characteristics of the board of directors and the company's reputation, finding that the 
higher the proportion of independent boards of directors, the better the company's 
reputation. A unidirectional relationship was also found between the reputation of the CEO 
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and the reputation of the company, as stated by Love et al., (2017). From the statement 
above, the hypothesis was concluded as below: 
H7 = The reputation of the CEO can moderate the relationship between the board 
independence and the value relevance of the financial statements. 
2.15 Board Activity and Value Relevance with CEO’s Reputation as Moderator 
The intensity of the activity of the board of directors is a relevant attribute for the value in 
increasing the effectiveness of the board of directors. The number of board meetings was 
commonly used as an indicator of board involvement in previous studies. The activities of 
the board help to improve the oversight of the manager's decision-making (Brick & 
Chidambaran, 2010). As a result, decreasing the number of board meetings will decrease 
agency expenses and be seen as a symbol of good business conduct in the marketplace 
(Bravo et al., 2015). In his theory, Pfeffer (1972) claims that a company's long-term viability 
is determined by external factors, and that the CEO's job is to bind the company to its 
external environment. The CEO's reputation is a measure of the company's long-term 
stability, but the higher the CEO's reputation, the more likely he or she will be absent from 
board meetings (Karuna, 2011). From the statement above, the hypothesis was concluded as 
below: 
H8 = The reputation of the CEO can moderate the relationship between the board activity and 
the value relevance of the financial statements. 
2.16 Board Gender Diversity and Value Relevance with CEO’s Reputation as 
Moderator 
The theory of resource dependency and agency theory have both been used to explain the 
position of women on boards of directors in the past. Women directors are encouraged to 
improve the board of directors' independence because women can ask questions and have 
fresh perspectives that directors with more conventional backgrounds cannot (Carter et al., 
2003). By balancing the diversity of company directors with the diversity of potential clients 
and staff, greater diversity promotes a broader understanding of the industry. Furthermore, 
diversity boosts imagination and innovation (Francoeur et al., 2008). According to the 
resource dependence principle, gender diversity can be used to obtain access to resources 
that are vital to a company's success (Pfeffer, 1972). The inclusion of women on the board, 
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on the other hand, will help a company's reputation (Bravo et al., 2015). This one-way 
relationship is identical to the one that exists between the company's reputation and the 
CEO's reputation (Weng & Chen, 2017). From the statement above, the hypothesis was 
concluded as below: 
H9 = The reputation of the CEO can moderate the relationship between the board gender 
diversity and the value relevance of the financial statements. 
2.17 Staggered Board and Value Relevance with CEO’s Reputation as Moderator 
The change in the board of directors is seen by shareholders as a classic weakness in 
corporate governance. They claim that they shield non-executive directors from market 
discipline and restrict directors' liability (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005). Changes in board 
positions, on the other hand, are seen as a tool for preserving board cohesion by proponents 
(Duru et al., 2013). In an opportunistic business, such as one with a change in board 
positions that needs good treatment from shareholders to create a good reputation, the 
manager tends to take root. Companies with a unitary council, on the other hand, do not need 
a reputation mechanism (Jiraporn & Chintrakarn, 2009). The CEO's job, according to 
resource dependency theory, is to link the business to external factors that trigger instability 
and external dependence for survival (Pfeffer, 1972). In the resource-dependent role, the 
CEO provides the business with resources such as knowledge, expertise, access to key 
stakeholders (for example, suppliers, customers, and public policymakers), and legitimacy 
(Hillman et al., 2000), as well as the CEO's personal reputation, which has a positive impact 
on the company's valuation (Weng & Chen, 2017). From the statement above, the hypothesis 
was concluded as below: 
H10 = The reputation of the CEO can moderate the relationship between the staggered board 
and the value relevance of the financial statements. 
3. Research Methodology 
The object of this research is focused on banking companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (BEI) for the period 2016 till 2019. The research focused on the banking sector is 
based on the consideration of how important the reputation of a bank CEO or president 
director is to the credibility of the bank, which affects the value of the company in the 
banking sector (Laurens, 2012), and considering that CEO awards in Indonesia are mostly 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 7/3 (2021): 60-85 
 
 73 
given to companies in the banking sector, so bank CEOs receive more special attention in 
Indonesia, as evidenced by the award "Bankers of the year award", "Top National Bankers" 
and "The Most Admired CEO". On the other hand, corporate governance in the banking sector 
received special attention after the monetary crisis, as companies in the banking sector 
dominate the economies of developing countries such as Indonesia and play a role in 
providing financial support to companies in countries called underdeveloped stock trade and 
are the center for mobilizing government savings (Tulung & Ramdani, 2018). Purposive 
sampling method is used in this study which mean the sample drawn must meet several 
criteria based on the objectives of the study. 
4. Research Finding 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Result 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Share Price 160 50,00000 33.425,00000 2.077,97000 4.322,50300 
Earnings Per 
Share 
160 -485,00000 1.159,00000 106,87020 221,31334 




9.177,69000 1.083,72310 2.840,83061 
Board Size 160 3,00000 14,00000 6,58000 2,65500 
Board 
Independence 
160 0,00000 1.00000 0,06230 0,16044 
Board Activity 160 4,00000 282,00000 31,07000 30,74400 
Board Gender 
Diversity 
160 0,00000 0,75000 0,18070 0,18430 
CEO Reputation 
Index 
160 5,00000 12,00000 7,31250 1,40613 
Source: Authors' calculations (2021) 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Result 
 Frequency Percentage 
Staggered Board 1 = The board of directors 
rotates every three years 
142 88,8 
0 = The board of directors does 
not rotate every three years 
18 11,3 
Total 160 100,0 
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Table 4:  P Value Result & Summary of Hypothesis 
No. IV   DV Original 
Sample 
P value Criteria Description 
H1 Board Size → Value 
Relevance 





0,036 0,611 < 0.05 Not 
Significant 
H3 Board Activity → Value 
Relevance 
0,211 0,148 < 0.05 Not 
Significant 




-0,062 0,342 < 0.05 Not 
Significant 
H5 Staggered Board → Value 
Relevance 
-0,233 0,265 < 0.05 Not 
Significant 


















-0,041 0,786 < 0.05 Not 
Significant 












0,217 0,434 < 0.05 Not 
Significant 
Source: Authors' calculations (2021) 
 
This study find out that the size of the board of directors has a major positive impact on the 
company's relevance value. This demonstrates that the bigger the board of directors, the 
wider and more diverse the expertise and viewpoints in decision-making would be, resulting 
in an improvement in the company's relevant value (Tshipa et al., 2018). This result support 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) agency theory, which argues that managers have vested agendas 
and do not behave in the best interests of shareholders. According to the agency's theory, a 
larger board of directors would increase oversight, which would lead to improved company 
performance (Kalsie & Shrivastav, 2016). These findings support the hypothesis and are in 
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line with studies by Almujamed & Alfraih (2020); Krismiaji & Surifah (2020); Krismiaji & 
Kusumadewi (2019); Tshipa et al., (2018); Tulung & Ramdani (2018). 
While the independence of the board of directors has a positive impact on the relevance 
value of the company, the findings showed that the second hypothesis was rejected. This is 
likely to occur because independent directors in developed countries are appointed 
primarily to comply with the provisions and legislation, as well as to legitimize and promote 
business operations, including future connections and contracts (Hassan et al., 2017). 
According to this study, the presence of an independent director would have little impact on 
the company's valuation if the independent director is selected outside of the established 
criteria (Fiador, 2013). The fit and proper test conducted by OJK as a prerequisite for the 
appointment of the board of directors that based on Indonesia Bank regulations no 
12/23/PBI/2010 does not have the purpose of raising the company's relevance value. The 
results of this study are supported by the research by Fiador (2013); Makarov et al., (2015); 
Tham Kah Marn & Romuald (2012); Wintoki et al., (2012); Zabri et al., (2016). 
The results showed rejection of the third hypothesis, although the activity of the board of 
directors had a positive effect on the relevant value, but it was not significant. The findings 
indicate that the frequency of board meetings has no impact on the relevant valuation of 
Indonesian banking companies. This is possibly due to the fact that the number of board 
meetings is simply a proxy for action, since it provides no indication of the work performed 
during the meeting (Ponnu & Karthigeyan, 2010). This study also shows that the provisions 
of Article 15 POJK 73 / POJK.05 / 2016 and the Board of Directors' Job Guidelines, which 
mandate directors to meet at least once a month, or twelve times a year, do not serve the 
purpose of increasing the company's value. The findings of this study agree with Abdallah 
Mohammad Qadorah (2018); Bawaneh (2020); Chaudhary & Gakhar (2018); Gavrea & 
Stegerean (2012); Ponnu & Karthigeyan (2010); Akram Naseem et al., (2017). 
The findings indicate that reporting gender diversity on the board of directors has no effect 
on the company's relevant value, however between the variables indicated a negative 
association that rejecting the fourth hypothesis. In an uncertain environment like Indonesia, 
companies are advised to choose directors who have the ability, compared to several 
directors, to increase the company's relevant value (Wellalage & Locke, 2013). Diversity can 
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also generate friction and have a detrimental impact on the efficacy of board communication 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009). Gender diversity, on the other hand, should be 
measured not only from an economic standpoint, but also from a social and ethical 
standpoint (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). The findings of this study agree with Chandani et 
al., (2018); Jhunjhunwala & Mishra (2012); Wellalage & Locke (2013). 
The findings indicated a negative association between changes in the board of directors' 
status and the company's relevant value, but it was not significant. The fifth theory is then 
rejected. This study is consistent with the stewardship theory suggested by Davis et al., 
(1997), which does not endorse a shift in board positions and views such a change as a 
systemic impediment to the board of directors. Since changes in the position of the board of 
directors will increase the value of a company that is not transparent while decreasing the 
value of a company (Duru et al., 2013) and banking companies in Indonesia appear to be 
transparent because they have been specifically supervised by OJK. The relationship between 
staggered board and the value relevance of the company shows negative results. The findings 
of this study are consistent with Amihud et al., (2018); Tshipa et al., (2018). 
The findings showed that the CEO's reputation cannot moderate the relationship between 
the size of the board of directors and the value relevance of the financial statements. The 
sixth hypothesis is then rejected. The presence or absence of a well-known CEO has no effect 
on the relationship between the size of the board of directors and the company's relevant 
value. This finding contradicts Pfeffer (1972) theory of resource dependence, which states 
that a company's survival is contingent on external resources given by the board of directors, 
such as the CEO's reputation. Regardless of the president director or CEO's reputation, 
having a good board of directors can add considerable value to a company. The CEO's 
reputation changes the direction of the relation between board size and value relevance from 
positive to negative. This is most likely due to a major positive relationship between the 
CEO's image and his or her compensation (Fedaseyeu et al., 2018), which increases the 
company's costs and results in the company's irrelevance (Nguyen et al., 2016). 
The role of the CEO's reputation in moderating the relationship between the board of 
directors independence and the financial statements' relevant value was investigated in this 
study. The findings indicate that the CEO's reputation cannot moderate the relationship 
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between the board of directors' independence and the company's value relevance. The 
seventh hypothesis is then rejected. Indonesian banking companies with independent 
directors and reputational CEO does not imply a high value for the company. The CEO's 
reputation change the relationship between the board of directors' independence and the 
company value relevance from positive to negative. This is likely to occur because the CEO's 
reputation will minimize the board of directors' independence (Graham et al., 2020), 
influencing decision-making in circumstances where the decision affects the company's 
relevant value. 
This study indicate that the CEO's reputation does not moderate the relationship between 
the activities of the board of directors and the relevant value of the company's financial 
statements. Indonesian banks with frequent board meetings and well-known CEOs or CEOs 
do not necessarily reflect a high level of relevant value. This is most likely because the 
reputable CEO is more focused on running a one-man show, so the meeting is more about 
achieving administrative targets than reaching a degree of understanding. 
The ability of the CEO's reputation to moderate the relationship between the board's gender 
diversity and the company's relevant values is explored in this study. The findings show that 
the CEO's reputation cannot moderate the relationship between the gender diversity of the 
board of directors and the relevant value of the company. As a result, it can be concluded that 
gender diversity on renowned boards of directors and CEOs in Indonesian banking 
companies does not mean that the business has high relevant value. This study supports 
Orozco et al., (2018) view that a company's credibility has little bearing on its financial 
performance, and it contradicts the principle of resource dependency, which notes that 
businesses rely on external resources to survive. 
The findings showed that the CEO's reputation was unable to moderate the relationship 
between changes in the board of directors and the relevant value. Changes in the board of 
directors' and reputable CEO's roles do not imply a high relevant value for the company. The 
CEO's reputation change the relationship between staggered board and value relevance from 
positive to negative. This may be due to the fact that having a reputable CEO who is judged 
on indications of a long term as CEO does not support a change in board positions (Dangé, 
2017). 





This study analyzes the effect of corporate governance and CEO’s reputation on relevance 
value. CEO’s reputation is also added to the research model as a moderating variable to be 
tested in explaining the effect of corporate governance on value relevance. The results found 
that board size was empirically proven to have a significant positive effect on value 
relevance. CEO’s reputation does not have a moderating effect on the influence of the 
corporate governance towards value relevance.  
The managerial implication of this research are suggesting the management of Indonesian 
banking companies by increasing the number of company directors to increase the 
company's value relevance. The recruitment of independent directors, multiple directors and 
changes in the position of the board of directors are not necessary because its do not affect 
the relevant value of the company. The company can reduce the number of board meetings 
which indirectly reduces the costs incurred with board meetings that do not in fact affect the 
relevant value of the company. When recruiting a CEO banking company, there is no need to 
pay attention to the reputation of the CEO, which apparently does not affect the relevant 
value of the company. 
The limitation of this study is we only use CEO's qualifications, association of professional 
institutions, CEO's tenure and CEO's experience as measures of the CEO's reputation, which 
is only a fraction of a CEO's overall reputation. The further research can also try to use a 
more detailed indicator of reputation such as the CEO's social media and the article produced 
by the CEO. 
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